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From Establishment to Freedom of Public Religion  
John Witte, Jr.1
Abstract 
This Article juxtaposes the theories of religious 
liberty developed by Thomas Jefferson and John Adams.  
It argues that Jefferson’s notion of a “wall of 
separation between church and state” was a minority 
view in his day, and in the century to follow.  More 
commonplace was Adams’ view that balanced the freedom 
of all peaceable private religions with the “mild and 
equitable establishment” of one public religion.  
Adam’s model of religious liberty dominated much of 
nineteenth-century law and culture, Jefferson’s model 
a good bit of twentieth-century law and culture.  In 
its most recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court seems to 
be developing a new model of religious liberty that 
draws on the insights of both Jefferson and Adams, but 
rejects their respective calls for the privatization 
or the establishment of religion.  The Court’s formula 
is that both private and public forms of religion 
deserve constitutional freedom and support, though 
neither may be given preferential treatment.  
Introduction 
The civic catechisms and canticles of our day 
still celebrate Thomas Jefferson's experiment in 
religious liberty.  To end a millennium of repressive 
religious establishments, we are taught, Jefferson 
sought liberty in the twin formulas of privatizing 
religion and secularizing politics.  Religion must be 
"a concern purely between our God and our 
consciences," he wrote.  Politics must be conducted 
with "a wall of separation between church and state."2  
                                                 
1 Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Director of Law and Religion Program, and Director of 
Center for the Interdisciplinary Study of Religion at Emory University.  This text is a lecture at a 
conference on “Faith and Law,” sponsored by the Ohio State Bar Association in Columbus, Ohio, 
on November 12, 2003.   I wish to thank Robert E. Reber, Stephen Cianca, and Ward Cornett for 
their kind invitation for me to participate in the event.  
2 8 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 113 (H. Washington, ed., 1853-1854). 
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"Public Religion"3 is a threat to private religion, and 
must thus be discouraged.  "Political ministry" is a 
menace to political integrity and must thus be 
outlawed.   
These Jeffersonian maxims remain for many today 
the cardinal axioms of a unique American logic of 
religious freedom to which every patriotic individual 
and institution should yield.  Every public school 
student learns the virtues of keeping his Bible at 
home and her prayers in the closet.  Every church 
knows the tax law advantages of high cultural 
conformity and low political temperature.  Every 
politician understands the calculus of courting 
religious favors without subvening religious causes.  
Religious privatization is the bargain we must strike 
to attain religious freedom for all.  A wall of 
separation is the barrier we must build to contain 
religious bigotry for good.  If only those right-wing 
killjoys of our day would learn proper patriotism, 
instead of pestering us with their Decalogues and 
faith-based initiatives!  
 "A page of history is worth a volume of logic," 
Justice Holmes once said.4  And careful historical work 
in the past two decades has begun to call a good deal 
of this popular Jeffersonian logic into question.  Not 
only are Jefferson's views on disestablishment and 
free exercise considerably more delphic than was once 
imagined.5  But the fuller account now available of the 
genesis and exodus of the American experiment in 
religious liberty suggests that Jefferson's views were 
hardly conventional in his own day--or in the century 
                                                 
3 A popular source of this phrase in American history is Benjamin Franklin, Proposals Relating to 
the Education of Youth in Pensilvania (1749), in Benjamin Franklin: Representative Selections 
203 (C. Jorgenson & F. Mott eds. 1962).  The school curriculum, said Franklin, must give 
“frequent opportunities of showing the Necessity of a Publick Religion, from its Usefulness to the 
Publick; the Advantage of a Religious Character, among private Persons; the Mischiefs of 
Supersitition, &c., and the Excellency of the CHRISTIAN RELIGION above all antient and 
modern.  Ibid., 203 (spelling and emphases in original).  See discussion of Franklin in Martin E. 
Marty, On a Medial Morraine: Religious Dimensions of American Constitutionalism,” 39 Emory 
L J 9, 16-17 (1990) and later formulations in Robert N. Bellah and Phillip B. Hammond, Varieties 
of Civil Religion in America (1980); Robert N. Bellah, The Broken Covenant: American Civil 
Religion in Time of Trial, 2d ed. (1992).  
4 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
5 See esp. Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation Between Church and 
State (2002); Philip A. Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (2002); John Witte, Jr., “That 
Serpentine Wall of Separation,” 101 Michigan Law Review __ (2003). 
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to follow.  Indeed, the Jeffersonian model of 
religious liberty came to constitutional prominence 
only in the 1940s, and then largely at the behest of 
the United States Supreme Court.  During much of the 
time before that, the American experiment was devoted 
not so much to privatizing religion and to 
secularizing politics, as to balancing the freedoms of 
all private religions against the establishment of one 
public religion.   
 The implications of these new historical insights 
have only begun to be worked out.  The hard religious 
right has woven these historical insights into a 
crusade to reclaim the nation's Christian roots and to 
reestablish its Christian traditions in place of the 
current establishment of secularism.  The hard 
religious left has converted them into a new 
appreciation for the bold prescience of the United 
States Supreme Court to anticipate the needs of our 
fragmented postmodern and post-Christian polity.  The 
Supreme Court itself, however, has quietly abandoned 
much of its earlier separationist logic in recent 
years, and moved gradually toward the recognition that 
both private and public forms of religion deserve 
constitutional freedom.  
To relate this story and its implications a bit 
more fully, permit me to revisit Jefferson's model of 
religious liberty, now viewed in juxtaposition with 
the model of religious liberty developed by John 
Adams, his life-long friendly rival.  It was Adams' 
model, more than Jefferson's, I shall argue, that 
dominated American constitutional law for the first 
150 years of the republic.  It was Jefferson's model 
that the Supreme Court revived in the 1940s to 
overcome the abuses and limitations that Adam's model 
had betrayed.  Today, I shall conclude, neither model 
standing alone is adequate, but the insights of both 
models can be combined into a new understanding of the 
freedom of public religion.  
 
I. Jefferson v. Adams on Religious Liberty 
As our civic catechism has taught us, Thomas 
Jefferson did regard his 1786 Law for the 
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Establishment of Religious Freedom in Virginia as a 
"fair" and "novel experiment."6  This law, declared 
Jefferson, defied the ancient assumptions of the West: 
that one form of Christianity must be established in a 
community, and that the state must protect and support 
it against all other religions.  Virginia would no 
longer suffer such state prescriptions or 
proscriptions of religion.  All forms of Christianity 
must now stand on their own feet and on an equal 
footing with the faiths of “the Jew and the Gentile, 
... the Mahometan, the Hindu, and [the] Infidel of 
every denomination.”7  Their survival and growth must 
turn on the cogency of their word, not the coercion of 
the sword, on the faith of their members, not the 
force of the law.  
True religious liberty, Jefferson argued, 
requires both the free exercise and the 
disestablishment of religion.  On the one hand, the 
state should protect the liberty of conscience and 
free exercise of all its subjects--however impious or 
impish their religious beliefs and customs might 
appear.  "Almighty God hath created the mind free," 
Jefferson wrote, and thus "no man shall be compelled 
to frequent or support any religious worship, place, 
or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, 
restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or 
goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his 
religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall 
be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their 
opinion in matters of religion, and that the same 
shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their 
civil capacities."8   
On the other hand, the state should disestablish 
all religion.  The state should not give special aid, 
support, privilege, or protection to religious 
doctrines or groups--through special tax 
appropriations and exemptions, special donations of 
goods and realty, or special laws of incorporation and 
criminal protection.  The state should not direct its 
laws to religious purposes.  The state should not draw 
on the services of religious associations, nor seek to 
interfere in their order, organization, or orthodoxy.  
                                                 
6 The Complete Jefferson, Containing His Major Writings 538  (Saul K. Padover, ed., 1943). 
7 Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography (1821), in ibid., 1147. 
8 12 The Statutes at Large … of Virginia 84-86 (W.W. Hening, ed., 1809-1823). 
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As Jefferson put it in his famous 1802 letter to the 
Danbury Baptist Association: "Believing with you that 
religion is a matter which lies solely between a man 
and his God, that he owes account to none other for 
his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers 
of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I 
contemplate ... a wall of separation between church 
and State."9   
Clergy were to respect this wall of separation as 
much as politicians.  Clergy needed to stick to their 
specialty of soulcraft rather than interfere in the 
specialty of statecraft.  Religion is merely “a 
separate department of knowledge,” Jefferson wrote, 
alongside other specialized disciplines like physics, 
biology, law, politics, and medicine.  Preachers are 
the specialists in religion, and are hired to devote 
their time and energy to this specialty.  “Whenever, 
therefore, preachers, instead of a lesson in religion, 
put them off with a discourse on the Copernican 
system, on chemical affinities, on the construction of 
government, or the characters of those administering 
it, it is a breach of contract, depriving their 
audience of the kind of service for which they were 
salaried.”10  
Jefferson life-long friendly rival, John Adams, 
wrote an equally spirited defense of the Massachusetts 
"experiment" in religious liberty.  "It can no longer 
be called in question," Adams wrote, that "authority 
in magistrates and obedience of citizens can be 
grounded on reason, morality, and the Christian 
religion,” without succumbing to “the monkery of 
priests or the knavery of politicians."11  The 1780 
Massachusetts Constitution, which Adams largely 
drafted, guarantees the liberty of conscience and free 
exercise of all its citizens.  But it also institutes 
a "mild and equitable establishment of religion," 
featuring special state protections and privileges for 
                                                 
9 The Complete Jefferson, supra note 6, at 673-76, 946-47, 957-58; 11 The Works of Thomas 
Jefferson 7-9 (P.L. Ford, ed., 1904-1905).  See analysis of Jefferson’s views in Driesbach, supra 
note 5; at Edwin S. Gaustad, Sworn on the Altar of God: A Religious Biography of Thomas 
Jefferson (1996). 
10 Thomas Jefferson, Letter to P.H. Wendover (March 13, 1815), quoted and discussed in 
Hamburger, supra note 5, at 152-54. 
11 John Adams, A Defense of the Constitutions of Government in the United States of America 
(1787), preface, in 4 The Works of John Adams 290 (J.F. Adams, ed., 1850-1856). 
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preferred forms of Christian piety, morality, and 
charity.12   
True religious liberty, Adams argued, requires 
the state to balance the freedom of many private 
religions with the establishment of one public 
religion.   
On the one hand, every civil society must protect 
a plurality of private religions⎯whose rights are 
limited only by the parallel rights of juxtaposed 
religions and the duties of the established public 
religion.  The notion that a state could coerce all 
persons into adherence and adherents to a common 
public religion alone was for Adams a philosophical 
fiction.  Persons would make their own private 
judgments in matters of faith.  Any attempt to coerce 
their consciences would only breed hypocrisy and 
resentment.  Moreover, the maintenance of religious 
plurality was essential for the protection of civil 
society and civil liberties.  "Checks and balances, 
Jefferson," Adams wrote to his friend in Monticello, 
in the political as well as the religious sphere "are 
our only Security, for the progress of Mind, as well 
as the Security of Body.  Every Species of Christians 
would persecute Deists, as either Sect would persecute 
another, if it had unchecked and unballanced Power.  
Nay, the Deists would persecute Christians, and 
Atheists would persecute Deists, with as unrelenting 
Cruelty, as any Christians would persecute them or one 
another.  Know thyself, Human nature!"13  
On the other hand, every polity must establish by 
law some form of public religion, some image and ideal 
of itself, some common values and beliefs to undergird 
and support the plurality of protected private 
religions.  The notion that a state could remain 
neutral and purged of any public religion was, for 
Adams, equally a philosophical fiction.  Absent a 
commonly adopted set of values and beliefs, 
politicians would invariably hold out their private 
convictions as public ones.  It was thus essential for 
each community to define and defend the basics of a 
                                                 
12  Ibid., 2:399, 3:451;  4:290-97;  8:232.  See further analysis in John Witte, Jr., “’A Most Mild 
and Equitable Establishment of Religion’: John Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment,” 41 J  
of Church & State 213-52 (1999). 
13 The Adams-Jefferson Letters 333-35 (Lester J. Cappon, ed., 1959). 
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public religion.  In Adams's view, its creed was 
honesty, diligence, devotion, obedience, virtue, and 
love of God, neighbor, and self.  Its icons were the 
Bible, the bells of liberty, the memorials of 
patriots, the constitution.  Its clergy were public-
spirited ministers and religiously-committed 
politicians.  Its liturgy was the public proclamation 
of oaths, prayers, songs, and election and 
Thanksgiving Day sermons.  Its policy was state 
appointment of chaplains for the legislature, 
military, and prison, state sanctions against 
blasphemy, sacrilege, and iconoclasm, state 
administration of tithe collections, test oaths, and 
clerical appointments, state sponsorship of religious 
societies, schools, and charities.  "Statesmen may 
plan and speculate for liberty," Adams wrote in 
defense of his views, "but it is religion and morality 
alone which can establish the principles upon which 
freedom can securely stand."  A "Publick Religion" 
sets "the foundation, not only of republicanism and of 
all free government, but of social felicity under all 
governments and in all the combinations of human 
society."14  
Here are two models of religious liberty offered 
by two of the greatest luminaries of the American 
founding era.  There were many other models available 
in their day⎯some more theological, some more 
philosophical in tone.  But these two models, given 
the eminence of their authors and the importance of 
their states of Virginia and Massachusetts, were of 
central importance.  Both Jefferson and Adams were 
self-consciously engaged in a new experiment in 
religious liberty.  Both started with the credo of the 
American Declaration of Independence which they 
drafted: that "all men are created equal" and that 
they have "certain unalienable rights."  Both insisted 
upon bringing within the mantle of constitutional 
protection every peaceable private religious belief 
and believer of their day.   
But while Jefferson advocated a robust freedom of 
exercise, Adams condoned only a "tempered" religious 
                                                 
14 Works of John Adams, supra note 11, at 2:399, 3:448-64; 4:193-209, 227-28, 290-97; 8:232; 9: 
419-20, 635-36; 10:253-54, 415-416; The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin 
Rush, 1805-1813  75-77, 191-195, 224-226, 338-340 (John A. Schutz and Douglass Adair, eds. 
1966). 
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freedom.  While Jefferson urged the separation of 
church and state, Adams urged only a division of 
religious and political offices.  While Jefferson 
advocated the disestablishment of all religions, Adams 
insisted on the "mild" establishment of one public 
religion.   
For Jefferson, to establish one public religion 
was to threaten all private religions.  To encourage 
religious uniformity was to jeopardize religious 
sincerity.  To limit religious exercise was to stymie 
religious development.  To enlist the church's 
ministry was to impugn the state's integrity.  
Religion was thus best left to the private sphere and 
sanctuary; church and state were best left separated 
from each other.   
Adams agreed that too little religious freedom 
was a recipe for hypocrisy and impiety.  But too much 
religious freedom, he argued, was an invitation to 
depravity and license.  Too firm a religious 
establishment would certainly breed coercion and 
corruption.  But too little a religious establishment 
would convert private prejudices into constitutional 
prerogatives.  Somewhere between these extremes a 
society must strike its balance.  
 
II. Adams' Model in Action 
For the first century and a half of the republic, 
it was Adams’ style of argument about religious 
liberty more than Jefferson’s that dominated the 
nation--even, ironically, in nineteenth-century 
Virginia.15  Before 1940, principal governance of the 
American experiment lay with the states, not with the 
federal government.  The First Amendment applied, by 
its terms, only to "Congress."16  Its provisions were 
rarely invoked and only lightly enforced by the 
federal courts.  Most questions of religious liberty 
                                                 
15 See Thomas E. Buckley, "The Use and Abuse of Jefferson's Statute: Separating Church and 
State in Nineteenth-Century Virginia," in Religion and the New Republic: Faith in the Founding of 
America 41-64 (James Hutson, ed., 2000); id., "After Disestablishment: Thomas Jefferson's Wall 
of Separation in Antebellum Virginia," 3 Journal of Southern History 445-80 (1995).  
16 U.S Const., Am. I: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof....” 
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were left to the states to resolve, each in accordance 
with its own state constitution.17
The dominant pattern was that states sought to 
balance the general freedom of all private religions 
with the general patronage of one common public 
religion--increasingly relying on the frontier as a 
release valve for the tensions between this private 
religious freedom and public religious patronage.  
On the one hand, state and local governments 
granted basic freedoms of conscience, exercise, and 
equality to most religious groups and religious 
practices, at least those that conformed with common 
culture and average temperament.  Most religious 
individuals were granted rights to assemble, speak, 
publish, parent, educate, travel, and the like on the 
basis of their religious beliefs.  Most religious 
groups were generally afforded the rights to 
incorporate, to hold property, to receive private 
donations, to enforce religious laws, and to maintain 
buildings, schools, and charities for their voluntary 
members.   
Many states, however, still dealt discriminately 
with religious minorities, particularly those of high 
religious temperature or low cultural conformity.  The 
New England states, for example, continued to resist 
the missionizing efforts of Catholics, Baptists, and 
Methodists, routinely delaying delivery of their 
corporate charters, tax exemptions, and educational 
licenses.  New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania were 
similarly churlish with Unitarians, Adventists, and 
Christian Scientists, often turning a blind eye to 
private abuses against them.  Virginia and the 
Carolinas tended to be hard on conservative 
Episcopalians and upstart Evangelicals alike.  Many of 
the southern states were notorious in their resistance 
to Catholic churches, schools, missions, and 
literature.  Few legislatures and courts, outside of 
the main cities on the Eastern seaboard, showed much 
respect for the religious rights of the few Jews or 
Muslims about, let alone the religious rights of 
Native Americans or enslaved African Americans.  
                                                 
17 For sources and fuller discussion of what follows in this section, see John Witte, Jr., Religion 
and the American Constitutional Experiment:  Essential Rights and Liberties 87-116 (2000). 
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On the other hand, state and local governments 
patronized a "public" religion that was generally 
Christian, if not Protestant, in character.  A "mass 
of organic utterances," as the Supreme Court later put 
it, attest to the typical features of this system.18   
State and local governments endorsed religious 
symbols and ceremonies.  "In God We Trust" and similar 
confessions appeared on governmental seals and 
stationery.  The Ten Commandments and favorite Bible 
verses were inscribed on the walls of court houses, 
public schools, and other public buildings.  
Crucifixes were erected in state parks and on state 
house grounds.  Flags flew at half mast on Good 
Friday.  Christmas, Easter, and other holy days were 
official holidays.  Sundays remained official days of 
rest.  Government-sponsored chaplains were appointed 
to the state legislatures, military groups, and state 
prisons, asylums, and hospitals.  Prayers were offered 
at the commencement of each session of many state 
legislatures and at city council meetings.  
Thanksgiving Day prayers were offered by governors, 
mayors, and local officials.  Election day sermons 
were offered, especially in rural and town churches, 
throughout the nineteenth century. 
State and local governments also afforded various 
forms of aid to religious groups.  Subsidies were 
given to Christian missionaries on the frontier.  
States and municipalities occasionally underwrote the 
costs of Bibles and liturgical books for poorer 
churches and donated land and services to them.  
Property grants and tax subsidies were furnished to 
Christian schools and charities.  Special criminal 
laws protected the property, clergy, and worship 
services of the churches.  Tax exemptions were 
accorded to the real and personal properties of many 
churches, clerics, and charities.  Tax revenues 
supported the acquisition of religious art and 
statuary for state museums and other public buildings. 
State and local governments predicated some of 
their laws and policies on biblical teachings.  Many 
of the first public schools and state universities had 
mandatory courses in the Bible and religion and 
                                                 
18 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 478 (1892). 
 10
compulsory attendance in daily chapel and Sunday 
worship services.  Employees in state prisons, 
reformatories, orphanages, and asylums were required 
to know and to teach basic Christian beliefs and 
values.  Polygamy, prostitution, pornography, and 
other sexual offenses against Christian morals and 
mores were prohibited.  Blasphemy and sacrilege were 
still prosecuted.  Gambling, lotteries, fortune-
telling, and other activities that depended on fate or 
magic were forbidden.  In many jurisdictions, these 
and other laws were predicated on explicitly religious 
grounds.  It was a commonplace of nineteenth-century 
American legal thought that "Christianity is a part of 
the common law."19   
This prevalent pattern of balancing the freedom 
of all private religions with the patronage of one 
public religion worked well enough for the more 
religiously homogeneous times and towns of the early 
republic.  The established public religion confirmed 
and celebrated each community's civic unity and 
confessional identity.  It also set natural limits to 
both political action and individual freedom--limits 
that were enforced more by communal reprobation than 
by constitutional litigation.   
One of the saving assumptions of this system was 
the presence of the frontier, and the right to 
emigrate thereto. Religious minorities who could not 
abide a community's religious restrictions or accept 
its religious patronage were not expected to stay long 
to fight the local establishment as their European 
counterparts had done.  They moved--sometimes at 
gunpoint--to establish their own communities on the 
frontier, often on the heels of missionaries and 
schoolmasters who had preceded them.  Mormons moved 
from New York to Ohio, to Missouri, to Illinois, 
before finally settling in Utah and in neighboring 
states.  Catholics moved to California, the Dakotas, 
                                                 
19 The phrase was coined by Sir Matthew Hale in Taylor's Case, 1 Vent. 293, 86 English Reports 
189 (K.B. 1676), and is repeated in several American tracts and cases.  See, e.g., 2 The Works of 
James Wilson 671 (R.G. McCloskey ed., 1967); Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 
127, 198 (1844).  For analysis and other sources, see Stuart Banner, "When Christianity was Part 
of the Common Law," 16 Law and History Review 27 (1998); Daniel L. Dreisbach, “In Search of 
a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on 
References to God and the Christian Religion in the United States Constitution,” 48 Baylor Law 
Review 927 (1996). 
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Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, and New Mexico.  
Baptists and Methodists poured into the southern 
states from Georgia and Tennessee to Mississippi and 
Missouri.  Free spirits escaped to the mountainous 
frontiers of Wyoming, Montana, Washington, and 
Oregon.20   
The right and the duty to emigrate was a basic 
assumption of the early American experiment in 
religious liberty.  Many first-generation Americans 
had left their European faiths and territories to gain 
their freedom.  Accordingly, they embraced the right 
to leave--to exit their faith, to abandon their blood 
and soil, to reestablish their lives, beliefs, and 
identities afresh--as a cardinal axiom of religious 
freedom.  Escape to the frontier provided the release 
valve for the common nineteenth-century pattern of 
balancing freedom for all private religions with 
patronage of one public religion. 
As the American populace became more pluralized 
and the American frontier more populated, however, 
this system became harder to maintain.  The Second 
Great Awakening of 1810-1860 introduced to the 
American scene a host of newly minted faiths--
Adventists, Christian Scientists, Disciples, Holiness 
Churches, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, Pentecostals, 
Unitarians, and Universalists.  The Second Great 
Awakening also fueled what Edwin S. Gaustad has aptly 
called "the reconquest"21 of the original Eastern 
seaboard states by Evangelical Baptists and Methodists 
as well as by Roman Catholics.  The American Civil War 
(1861-1865) permanently divided Lutherans, 
Presbyterians, and other denominations into northern 
and southern branches.  The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments (1865-1870) not only outlawed 
slavery but also liberated a host of long-cloaked 
African beliefs and rituals, some in pure African 
forms, many inculturated with various Christian 
traditions.  After the 1860s, the great waves of 
European emigration brought new concentrations and 
forms of Catholicism and Protestantism from Ireland, 
Germany, and Great Britain, joined by a number of 
Catholic emigrants from Mexico.  After the 1880s, 
                                                 
20 For detailed religious demography, see Edwin S. Gaustad, et al., New Historical Atlas of  
Religion in America (2001). 
21 Ibid.  
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fresh waves of emigrants from Eastern Europe and 
Russia brought new forms and concentrations of 
Catholicism, Judaism, and Orthodox Christianity.  At 
the same time, a growing number of emigrants from 
across the Pacific introduced Buddhism, Confucianism, 
Hinduism, and other Eastern religions to the Western 
states.  
These movements of new inspiration, immigration, 
and invention radically recast the American religious 
map in the course of the nineteenth century--with the 
traditional Calvinist and Anglican strongholds of the 
early republic giving way especially to precocious new 
forms of Evangelical Baptists and Methodists, and 
scores of new religious groups.  
This radical reconfiguration of the American 
religious map in the later nineteenth century 
eventually challenged state constitutional patterns of 
religious liberty.  In particular, state policies of 
patronizing a preferred form of public religion became 
increasingly difficult to maintain with the growing 
plurality of the populace and the growing political 
strength of groups who opposed such policies.  Many 
Evangelical churches, both Baptist and Methodist, 
insisted that states adhere more firmly to principles 
of disestablishment and separatism; in a number of 
states, they gained the political power to revise the 
constitutions accordingly.  Religious minorities in 
many communities--whether Protestant, Catholic, 
Orthodox, Jewish, Adventist, or Mormon--also began to 
ally themselves in opposition to this system, 
particularly the patronage of a common Protestantism 
within the public schools.  Some of these minority 
religious communities refused to conform or to 
assimilate.  Others refused to live or leave quietly.  
Still others began to crusade actively against the 
system.   
When neither assimilation nor accommodation 
policies proved effective, state and local 
legislatures began to clamp down on these dissenters.  
At the turn of the twentieth century and increasingly 
thereafter, local officials began routinely to deny 
Roman Catholics their school charters, Jehovah's 
Witnesses their preaching permits, Eastern Orthodox 
their canonical freedoms, Jews and Adventists their 
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Sabbath-day accommodations, non-Christian pacifists 
their conscientious objection status.  As state courts 
and legislatures turned an increasingly blind eye to 
their plight, religious dissenters began to turn to 
the federal courts for relief.   
 
 
III. Jefferson's Model in Action 
 The United States Supreme Court responded 
forcefully to their plight of the dissenters--first by 
applying the First Amendment to the states, then by 
applying Jefferson's model to the First Amendment.  
Both moves brought fundamental change to the American 
experiment. 
In the landmark cases of Cantwell v. Connecticut 
(1940)22 and Everson v. Board of Education (1947)23, the 
Court read the First Amendment religion clauses into 
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
On its face, the Court said, the First Amendment binds 
the federal government: "Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."  As a general 
statement of religious liberty, the First Amendment 
also binds state governments.  For religious liberty 
is part of the corpus of fundamental liberties in the 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee that "no state shall 
deprive any person of ... liberty ... without due 
process of law."24  By so incorporating the First 
Amendment into the Fourteenth, the Court accomplished 
what sixteen failed amendments to the Constitution 
could not accomplish--to create a national law on 
religious liberty, governed by the federal courts, and 
enforceable against state and local governments.  
In its early application of the free exercise 
clause, the Court simply adjusted the American 
experiment by protecting the rights of newly emergent 
religious groups against recalcitrant local officials.  
Jehovah's Witnesses, the Court held repeatedly, could 
                                                 
22 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
23 330 U.S.  1 (1947). 
24 U.S. Const., Am. XIV, sec. 1. 
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not be denied licenses to preach, parade, or 
pamphleteer just because they were unpopular.25  Public 
school students could not be compelled to salute the 
flag or recite the pledge if they were conscientiously 
opposed.26  Other parties, with scruples of conscience, 
could not be forced to swear oaths before receiving 
citizenship status, property tax exemptions, state 
bureaucratic positions, social welfare benefits, or 
standing in courts.27  Such free exercise remedies can 
be read as an effort to make the traditional state 
establishments of a public religion more "mild and 
equitable" for the many new private religions on the 
American scene.   
In its early application of the establishment 
clause, however, the Court radically reconfigured the 
American experiment, by outlawing state establishments 
of public religion altogether.  State patronage of a 
public religion, the Court held, was not only a threat 
to an individual’s free exercise rights.  It was also 
a violation of the government’s non-establishment 
duties.  It was Thomas Jefferson who had first seen 
the virtues of combining a strong free exercise clause 
with a strong disestablishment clause.  It was Thomas 
Jefferson who had hit upon the formula for enforcing 
both clauses with equal vigor--by consigning religion 
to the private sphere and sanctuary, and by separating 
church from state.  Jefferson's views henceforth would 
be the law of the nation.  In the words of Justice 
Black in Everson: 
The "establishment of religion" 
clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a 
state nor the Federal Government 
can set up a church.  Neither can 
pass laws which aid one religion, 
aid all religions, or prefer one 
religion over another.  Neither 
can force nor influence a person 
to go or to remain away from 
                                                 
25 The main cases are Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 296; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 141 (1943);  Follet v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 574 (1944); 
Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).  
26 The main case is West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).   
27 The main cases are In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945); Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 
(1946); First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958).    
 15
church against his will or force 
him to profess a belief or 
disbelief in any religion.  No 
person can be punished for 
entertaining or professing 
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, 
for church attendance or non-
attendance.  No tax in any amount, 
large or small, can be levied to 
support any religious activities 
or institutions, whatever they may 
be called, or whatever form they 
may adopt to teach or practice 
religion.  Neither a state nor the 
Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the 
affairs of any religious 
organizations or groups, or vice 
versa.  In the words of Jefferson, 
the clause against establishment 
of religion by law was intended to 
erect "a wall of separation 
between church and state."28
Everson was an open invitation to litigation.  A 
long tradition of state and local policies that 
patronized a public religion was now open to 
challenge.  The new application of the First Amendment 
religion clauses to the states encouraged such 
extensive litigation.  The Everson Court's adoption of 
the Jeffersonian model of religious liberty demanded 
it.  Hundreds of establishment clause cases poured 
into the lower federal courts after the 1940s.  
The Supreme Court applied its newly minted 
Jeffersonian logic primarily in cases challenging the 
traditional state patronage of religious education, 
devoting nearly three quarters of its establishment 
clause cases to this issue.  On the one hand, the 
Court removed religion from the public school.  Public 
schools could not offer prayers or moments of silence, 
could not read Scripture or religious texts, could not 
house Bibles or prayer books, could not teach theology 
or creationism, could not display Decalogues or 
crèches, could not use the services or facilities of 
                                                 
28 Everson 330 U.S. at 15-16. 
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religious bodies.29  On the other hand, the Court 
removed religious schools from state support.  States 
could not provide salary and service supplements to 
religious schools, could not reimburse them for 
administering standardized tests, could not lend them 
state-prescribed textbooks, supplies, films, or 
counseling services, could not allow tax deductions or 
credits for religious school tuition.30     
In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court distilled 
the Jeffersonian logic of its early cases into a 
general test to be used in all establishment clause 
cases.31  Henceforth every law challenged under the 
establishment clause would pass constitutional muster 
only if it could satisfy three criteria.  The law 
must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
and (3) foster no excessive entanglement between 
church and state.  Incidental religious "effects" or 
modest "entanglements" of church and state could be 
tolerated, but defiance of any of these criteria would 
be constitutionally fatal.   
This constitutional reification of Jeffersonian 
logic rendered the establishment clause a formidable 
obstacle to many traditional forms of state patronage 
of public religion.  Particularly the lower courts 
used this test to outlaw all manner of government 
subsidies for religious charities, social services, 
and mission works, government use of religious 
services, facilities, and publications, government 
protections of Sundays and Holy Days, government 
enforcement of blasphemy and sacrilege laws, 
government participation in religious rituals and 
religious displays.  It must be emphasized that it 
often did not take law suits to effectuate these 
reforms.  Particularly local governments, sensitive to 
the political and fiscal costs of constitutional 
                                                 
29 The main cases are McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421 (1962); Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 
38 (1985).  
30 The main cases are Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 
(1973); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Grand 
Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).  See 
infra note 32 for cases overturning several of these precedents.  
31 Lemon, 403 U.S. at  602.  
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litigation, often voluntarily ended their prayers, 
removed their Decalogues, and closed their coffers to 
religion long before any case was filed against them.  
The Jeffersonian logic of the establishment clause 
seemed to demand this.  
 
IV. Toward the Freedom of Public Religion 
While many officials and citizens have remained 
faithful to this Jeffersonian logic, the Supreme Court 
of late has been quietly defying it and reversed some 
of its harshest separationist precedents.32 The Court 
has not yet crafted a coherent new logic, let alone 
consistent new test, to resolve these disputes and has 
been properly pilloried for some of its blundering 
opinions.  But these cases hold signposts of a new way 
to define and defend the legal place of public 
religion.  
Tradition has become one strong vector in some of 
the Court's recent First Amendment cases.  The Court 
had used arguments from tradition a few times before, 
as part of broader rationales for upholding religious 
tax exemptions and Sabbath Day laws.  But in Marsh v. 
Chambers (1983), the argument from tradition became 
the exclusive basis for upholding a state 
legislature's practice of funding a chaplain and 
opening its sessions with his prayers.  Writing for 
the Court, Chief Justice Burger defended such 
practices as a noble survival of the traditional 
public role of religion in American life and law: "In 
light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more 
than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the 
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer 
has become part of the fabric of our society.  To 
invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with 
making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an 
'establishment' of religion [but] simply a tolerable 
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the 
people of this country.... '[W]e are a religious 
                                                 
32 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2001), overruling Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 329 (1975) 
and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997), 
overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
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people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being'."33  
Arguments from tradition, while by themselves 
rarely convincing, can sometimes bolster a broader 
rationale for upholding traditional features of a 
public religion and a religious public.  Tradition can 
sometimes serve effectively as something of a null 
hypothesis--to be overcome by strong constitutional 
arguments rather than discarded by simple invocations 
of principle.  As Justice Holmes once put it: "If a 
thing has been practised for two hundred years by 
common consent, it will need a strong case for the 
Fourteenth Amendment to affect it."34  Innocuous long-
standing practices, therefore, such as religious tax 
exemptions, military chaplains, prison prayer books, 
and public displays of Decalogues and of other 
religious symbols might well be justified. 
There are limits and dangers to arguments from 
tradition, which the Court itself betrayed the 
following year.  In Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) the Court 
upheld a municipality's traditional practice of 
maintaining a manger scene (a crèche) on a public park 
as part of a large holiday display in a downtown 
shopping area.  "There is an unbroken history of 
official acknowledgment by all three branches of 
government of the role of religion in American life," 
Chief Justice Burger wrote, repeating his Marsh 
argument and now giving an ample list of 
illustrations.35   
There is another reason to uphold this display, 
however, Burger continued.  Crèches, while of 
undoubted religious significance to Christians, are 
merely "passive" parts of "purely secular displays 
extant at Christmas."  They "engender a friendly 
community spirit of good will," that "brings people 
into the central city and serves commercial interests 
and benefits merchants."36  The prayers that are 
occasionally offered at the crèche, Justice O'Connor 
wrote in concurrence, merely "solemnize public 
                                                 
33  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), quoting, in part, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 
(1952). 
34 Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922). 
35 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 675 (1984). 
36 Ibid., 685. 
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occasions, express confidence in the future, and 
encourage the recognition of what is worthy of 
appreciation in society."37  Governmental participation 
in and support of such "ceremonial deism," the Court 
concluded, cannot be assessed by "mechanical logic" or 
"absolutist tests" of establishment.  "It is far too 
late in the day to impose a crabbed reading of the 
[Disestablishment] Clause on the country."38
A crabbed reading of establishment would have 
been better than such a crass rendering of religion.  
For the Court to suggest that crèches are mere 
advertisements, prayers mere ceremony, and piety mere 
nostalgia is to create an empty "American Shinto"39--a 
public religion that is perhaps purged enough of its 
confessional identity to pass constitutional muster, 
but too bleached and too bland to be religiously 
efficacious, let alone civilly effective.   
Arguments from tradition, while helpful, are thus 
inherently limited in their ability to define and 
defend the public place of religion today.  Such 
arguments perforce assume a traditional definition of 
what a public religion is--namely, a common system of 
beliefs, values, and practices drawn eclectically from 
the multiple denominations within a community.  In the 
religiously homogeneous environment of John Adams' 
day, a public religion of the common denominator and 
common denomination still had the doctrinal rigor, 
liturgical specificity, and moral suasion to be 
effective.  In the religiously heterogeneous 
environment of our day--with more than 1,000 
incorporated denominations on the books--no such 
effective common religion can be readily devised or 
defended.  
More recent cases suggest a budding new way of 
defining and defending the legal place of public 
religion.  The Court has numerous times upheld 
government policies that support the public access and 
activities of religious individuals and groups--so 
long as these religious parties act voluntarily, and 
so long as non-religious parties also benefit from the 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 693 (O’Connor, J. concurring). 
38 Ibid., 687. 
39 The phrase if from John T. Noonan, Jr., The Lustre of our Country: The American Experience 
of Religious Freedom 230-31 (1998). 
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same government support.  Under this logic, Christian 
clergy were just as entitled to run for state 
political office as non-religious candidates.40  
Church-affiliated pregnancy counseling centers could 
be funded as part of a broader federal family 
counseling program.41  Religious student groups could 
have equal access to state university and public 
school classrooms that were open to non-religious 
student groups.42  Religious school students were just 
as entitled to avail themselves of general 
scholarships, remedial, and disability services as 
public school students.43  Religious groups were given 
equal access to public facilities or civic education 
programs that were already opened to other civic 
groups.44  Religious parties were just as entitled as 
non-religious parties to display their symbols in 
public forums.45  Religious student newspapers were 
just as entitled to public university funding as those 
of non-religious student groups.46  Religious schools 
were just as entitled as other private schools to 
participate in a state-sponsored educational 
improvement or school voucher or educational program.47   
These holdings were defended on wide-ranging 
constitutional grounds--as a proper accommodation of 
religion under the disestablishment clause, as a 
necessary protection of religion under the free speech 
or free exercise clauses, as a simple application of 
the equal protection clause, among other arguments.  
One theme common to many of these cases, however, 
is that public religion must be as free as private 
religion.  Not because the religious groups in these 
cases are really non-religious.  Not because their 
public activities are really non-sectarian.  And not 
because their public expressions are really part of 
the cultural mainstream.  To the contrary, these 
                                                 
40 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978).  
41 Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
42 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Board of Education of the Westside Community 
Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
43 Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
44 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Good 
News Club v. Milford Central School District, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).  
45 Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).  
46 Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
47 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S.Ct. 24690 (2002). 
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public groups and activities deserve to be free, just 
because they are religious, just because they engage 
in sectarian practices, just because they sometimes 
take their stands above, beyond, and against the 
mainstream.  They provide leaven and leverage for the 
polity to improve.  
A second theme common to these cases is that the 
freedom of public religion sometimes requires the 
support of the state.  Today's state is not the 
distant, quiet sovereign of Jefferson's day from whom 
separation was both natural and easy.  Today's modern 
welfare state, whether for good or ill, is an 
intensely active sovereign from whom complete 
separation is impossible.  Few religious bodies can 
now avoid contact with the state's pervasive network 
of education, charity, welfare, child care, health 
care, family, construction, zoning, workplace, 
taxation, security and other regulations.  Both 
confrontation and cooperation with the modern welfare 
state are almost inevitable for any religion.  When a 
state's regulation imposes too heavy a burden on a 
particular religion, the free exercise clause should 
provide a pathway to relief.  When a state's 
appropriation imparts too generous a benefit to 
religion alone, the establishment clause should 
provide a pathway to dissent.  But when a general 
government scheme provides public religious groups and 
activities with the same benefits afforded to all 
other eligible recipients, disestablishment clause 
objections are not only “crabbed” but corrosive. 
A third theme common to these cases is that a 
public religion cannot be a common religion.  If the 
religious gerrymandering of Lynch v. Donnelly and its 
progeny had not already made this clear, these more 
recent cases underscore the point.  Today, our public 
religion must be a collection of particular religions, 
not the combination of religious particulars.  It must 
be a process of open religious discourse, not a 
product of ecumenical distillation.  All religious 
voices, visions, and values must be heard and 
deliberated in the public square.  All public 
religious services and activities, unless criminal or 
tortious, must be given a chance to come forth and 
compete, in all their denominational particularity.   
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Some conservative Evangelical and Catholic groups 
today have seen and seized on this insight better than 
most. Their rise to prominence in the public square in 
recent years should not be met with glib talk of 
censorship or habitual incantation of Jefferson's 
mythical wall of separation.  The rise of the so-
called Christian right should be met with the equally 
strong rise of the Christian left, of the Christian 
middle, and of many other Jewish, Muslim, and other 
religious groups who test and contest its premises, 
prescriptions, and policies.  That is how a healthy 
democracy works.  The real challenge of the new 
Christian right is not to the integrity of American 
politics but to the apathy of American religions.  It 
is a challenge for peoples of all faith and of no 
faiths to take their place in the marketplace.   
A fourth teaching of these cases is that freedom 
of public religion also requires freedom from public 
religion.  Government must strike a balance between 
coercion and freedom.  The state cannot coerce 
citizens to participate in religious ceremonies and 
subsidies that they find odious.48 But the state cannot 
prevent citizens from participation in public 
ceremonies and programs just because they are 
religious. It is one thing to outlaw Christian prayers 
and broadcasted Bible readings from the public school; 
after all, students are compelled to be there.  It is 
quite another thing to ban moments of silence and 
private religious speech in these same public schools.  
It is one thing to bar direct tax support for 
religious education, quite another thing to bar tax 
deductions for parents who choose to educate their 
children in religious schools.  It is one thing to 
prevent government officials from delegating their 
core police powers to religious bodies, quite another 
thing to prevent them from facilitating the charitable 
services of voluntary religious and non-religious 
associations alike.  It is one thing to outlaw 
governmental prescriptions of prayers, ceremonies, and 
symbols in public forums, quite another thing to 
outlaw governmental accommodations of private prayers, 
ceremonies, and symbols in these same public forums. 
                                                 
48 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1991); Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 
290 (2000).  
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Individuals should exercise a comparable prudence 
in seeking protection from public religion.  In the 
public religion schemes of nineteenth-century America, 
it was not so much the courts as the frontier that 
provided this freedom--a place away from it all, where 
one could escape with one's conscience and co-
religionists.  Today, the frontier still provides this 
freedom--if not physically in small towns and wild 
mountains, then virtually in our ability to sift out 
and shut out the public voices of religion that we do 
not wish to hear.   
Both modern technology and modern privacy make 
escape to the frontier considerably easier than in the 
days of covered wagons and mule trains.  Just turn off 
CBN.  Turn away the missionary at your door.  Close 
your eyes to the city crucifix that offends.  Cover 
your ears to the public prayer that you can't abide.  
Forgo the military chaplain's pastoral counseling.  
Skip the legislative chaplain's prayers.  Walk by the 
town hall's menorah and star.  Don't read the 
Decalogue behind the judge.  Don't join the religious 
student group.  Don't vote for the collared candidate.  
Don't browse the Evangelicals' newspapers.  Avoid the 
services of the Catholic counselors.  Shun the 
readings of the Scientologists.  Turn down the 
trinkets of the colporteurs.  Turn back the ministries 
of the hate-mongers.  All these escapes to the virtual 
frontier, the law does and will protect -- with force 
if necessary.  Such voluntary self-protections from 
religion will ultimately provide far greater religious 
freedom for all than pressing yet another tired 
constitutional case.  
 
 
 24
